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RECESS IS OVER: GRANTING MIRANDA RIGHTS TO 
STUDENTS INTERROGATED INSIDE SCHOOL WALLS 
ABSTRACT 
When school officials and law enforcement question students about 
suspicious activities without parents or legal counsel present, students are 
overmatched. This power imbalance raises questions about whether students’ 
constitutional rights are being adequately protected. These questions have 
gone largely unanswered, as the Supreme Court has never addressed the 
applicability of Miranda warnings in school interrogation settings. However, 
the 2011 J.D.B. v. North Carolina decision, in which the Supreme Court held a 
defendant’s age relevant to custody for Miranda purposes, has opened the door 
for a reevaluation of the dynamics of school interrogations. 
This Comment argues that the mere presence of a law enforcement officer 
at a student’s interrogation, occurring on school grounds in the absence of 
legal counsel, transforms the encounter into custodial interrogation, thus 
requiring Miranda warnings to be given. This argument rests on two 
foundations: (1) scientific evidence demonstrating that adolescents’ brains are 
developmentally different from adults’ brains, rendering them more vulnerable 
to shows of authority; and (2) the coercive effect of increasing law 
enforcement presence on school grounds in recent decades. Students deserve 
Miranda’s protections when law enforcement is present during questioning 
because this police-dominated, inherently coercive interrogation environment 
is what the Miranda Court sought to protect against. 
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INTRODUCTION 
[I]n the school environment, where juveniles are faced with a variety 
of negative consequences—including potential criminal charges—for 
refusing to comply with the requests or commands of authority 
figures, the circumstances are inherently more coercive and require 
more, not less, careful protection of the rights of the juvenile.1 
Determining what constitutional rights children have while on school 
grounds has always presented unique challenges for the criminal justice 
system. School officials seek to maintain order, implement discipline, and 
provide a safe place for children to learn. Yet “children assuredly do not ‘shed 
their constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate.’”2 
This Comment focuses on a troubling area in which students lack adequate 
protection—interrogation by school officials and law enforcement on school 
grounds without parents or legal counsel present. The Supreme Court has 
never decided a case addressing the applicability of Miranda warnings in 
school interrogation settings. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court 
protected individuals’ Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by 
requiring law enforcement to warn individuals of their Miranda rights when 
subject to custodial interrogation,3 and this protection was later extended to 
adolescents.4 Under this formula, self-incrimination protections depend on 
custodial status.5 For Miranda purposes, custody exists when an individual is 
formally arrested or has his freedom of movement restricted to the degree 
associated with formal arrest.6 The custody analysis is crucial because if a 
court finds that custody did not exist, then an individual’s Fifth Amendment 
 
 1 In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d 135, 147 (N.C. 2009) (Hudson, J., dissenting), rev’d and remanded sub nom. 
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011). 
 2 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655–56 (1995) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). 
 3 384 U.S. 436, 468–69 (1966). Miranda rights are the warnings given to a criminal suspect by law 
enforcement to protect the suspect’s privilege against self-incrimination during custodial interrogation. 
Miranda rights include the right to remain silent, the right to counsel prior to questioning, the right to have 
counsel present during any questioning, and the right to an appointed attorney if the individual wants an 
attorney and cannot afford to hire one. Id. at 467–73. 
 4 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967). The terms adolescent, child, and student are used interchangeably 
throughout this Comment to refer to a child under the age of eighteen. This Comment avoids using the term 
juvenile because of the word’s negative association with the criminal justice system. This Comment does not 
use the term teenager because this would include individuals who are eighteen or nineteen years old. 
 5 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
 6 See id.; see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984). 
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privilege against self-incrimination is not implicated, Miranda warnings are 
not required, and all of his statements will be admissible in court.7 
In cases that involve interrogations conducted on public school grounds, 
courts must assess custody in one of four different scenarios: (1) when school 
officials question students independently and law enforcement is not present or 
involved; (2) when law enforcement is present during the questioning but does 
not speak or otherwise participate; (3) when law enforcement is involved in the 
questioning but makes a minimal contribution; or (4) when law enforcement 
actively participates in the questioning with the school official. Currently, most 
courts have a high custody threshold—finding that custody exists only when 
law enforcement actively participates in the student’s interrogation.8 
This Comment argues that the custody threshold should be lowered in the 
school setting because the mere presence of law enforcement is enough to 
create a coercive effect that requires Miranda warnings. 
In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, a case decided in 2011, the Court expanded its 
prior custody analysis to include the defendant’s age as a relevant factor.9 
Although the Court did not decide the issue of custodial interrogation in 
J.D.B.,10 the Supreme Court in that case, and other recent cases like Roper v. 
Simmons11 and Graham v. Florida,12 extended additional constitutional 
protections to adolescents. Citing scientific research that details the stark 
developmental differences between adolescent and adult brains, the Court 
recognized that adolescents need special protection under certain 
circumstances.13 
 
 7 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
 8 See infra Part I.C.1. 
 9 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2408 (2011). Previously, in Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 666–68 (2004), 
the Court declined to address the objective, reasonable person analysis to include the defendant’s age as a 
relevant factor. That case involved a seventeen-year-old boy. Id. at 656. 
 10 The Court had the opportunity to take its holding one step further by addressing how custody should 
be analyzed in school interrogation settings, but instead left this determination to the state court. J.D.B., 131 S. 
Ct. at 2408. 
 11 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposing the 
death penalty on offenders who were under the age of eighteen when their crimes were committed). 
 12 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (holding that the Constitution prohibits imposing a sentence of life 
without parole on an adolescent who did not commit homicide). In 2012, the Supreme Court extended 
Graham, holding that mandatory life imprisonment without parole was unconstitutional when imposed on 
adolescent offenders, including adolescent offenders who committed homicide. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 
2455, 2460 (2012). 
 13 See infra Part II.A. 
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This Comment argues for a natural extension of what the Court has already 
held by asking courts to consider how these scientific findings apply when 
adolescents are interrogated in the school setting. It contends that an 
interrogation attended by both school and law enforcement officials creates a 
coercive environment that turns questioning into custodial interrogation, even 
when law enforcement officials do not speak.14 In short, students will be 
overmatched by law enforcement and school officials and compelled to 
respond to questioning. When students are questioned in this type of 
environment, they must be warned of their Miranda rights. 
Part I of this Comment provides the constitutional backdrop for the custody 
analysis. It begins with an explanation of the state action doctrine’s relevance 
in the public school setting, describing which state actors are required to give 
Miranda warnings during custodial interrogations. Next, it discusses the 
constitutional protection afforded to targets of custodial interrogation by 
introducing Miranda and its progeny. It defines “custodial interrogation” and 
the test courts use to determine when it has occurred. Lastly, Part I explores the 
holdings and rationales of the pre-J.D.B. lower court decisions addressing 
school interrogation issues, analyzing the factors that supported a custody 
finding and influenced a no-custody finding. 
Part II focuses on the Supreme Court’s willingness to extend special 
protections to adolescents and its citation to social science research on brain 
development. This Part introduces the social science research in this area and 
argues that this research demonstrates that adolescents are more vulnerable 
than adults in general interrogation settings. To this end, Part II examines the 
Supreme Court’s use of social science research in Roper, Graham, and J.D.B. 
Part II discusses studies by neuroscientists and developmental psychologists 
that reveal adolescents’ vulnerability in general interrogation settings. Part II.B 
identifies three factors that make adolescents particularly vulnerable in general 
interrogation settings: (1) adolescents’ vulnerability to make false confessions; 
(2) adolescents’ immaturity of judgment; and (3) adolescents’ compliance with 
demands from authority figures. 
Part III argues that the distinctive aspects of the public school setting 
exacerbate adolescents’ vulnerability during interrogations and ultimately 
create a coercive environment akin to custody. It contends that interrogating 
adolescents in the school setting is uniquely coercive for four reasons: (1) the 
 
 14 This Comment does not address what protections, if any, should be afforded to students when they are 
questioned solely by school officials. 
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increased presence of law enforcement in public schools; (2) the increased 
reporting of student behavior to law enforcement; (3) the adversarial 
relationship between school officials and students; and (4) the restriction of 
students’ freedom of movement while attending school. This Part argues that 
these coercive factors create the need for Miranda warnings because students 
will be overmatched by law enforcement and school officials, leaving students 
with no choice but to submit to the interrogation. 
Lastly, Part IV addresses the countervailing concerns about this 
Comment’s proposal. Part IV includes the concerns that requiring Miranda 
warnings will (1) impede law enforcement’s ability to obtain confessions; (2) 
conflict with custody’s totality-of-the-circumstances test; (3) create a more 
adversarial relationship between school officials and students; and (4) 
inadequately protect students’ constitutional rights during interrogation. 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL GUIDELINES FOR CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION 
Miranda warnings, which protect an individual’s Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination, are implicated whenever an individual is 
subject to custodial interrogation.15 Over the years, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that the protections of Miranda apply to adolescents as well as to 
adults,16 and the Court has recently held that a defendant’s age is a relevant 
factor in the Miranda custody analysis.17 However, Miranda rights only apply 
when law enforcement state actors have initiated questioning. Accordingly, 
this Part opens with an explanation of the state action doctrine as it applies in 
the school setting. Then it discusses the Miranda decision and its progeny. 
These cases govern the protections given to individuals who are subject to 
custodial interrogation. Part I.B.2 defines custodial interrogation and describes 
the test courts use to determine custody. Lastly, Part I examines how lower 
courts determined school interrogation issues before J.D.B. 
A. The State Action Doctrine 
Under the state action doctrine, the constitutional protections set forth in 
the Bill of Rights protect individuals from constitutional violations by state 
 
 15 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 467–73 (1966); see also infra note 47 and accompanying 
text. 
 16 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967). 
 17 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2408 (2011). 
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actors.18 Accordingly, actions taken by the government can violate an 
individual’s constitutional rights whereas actions by private individuals 
generally cannot trigger constitutional violations.19 For purposes of the 
Miranda custody analysis, there are three types of people who conduct 
questioning: (1) law enforcement state actors; (2) other state actors; and (3) 
private actors. Because the Court in Miranda was concerned about protecting 
those subjected to the inherently coercive environment of police-dominated 
custodial interrogations,20 law enforcement and those acting as agents of law 
enforcement are the only state actors required to give Miranda warnings.21 
Public school officials are state actors,22 but they are not law enforcement;23 
for that reason, courts have not required public school officials to give 
 
 18 See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991) (“The Constitution’s 
protections of individual liberty and equal protection apply in general only to action by the government.”). 
 19 See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988) (“Embedded in our 
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence is a dichotomy between state action, which is subject to scrutiny under 
the Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and private conduct, against which the Amendment affords no shield, 
no matter how unfair that conduct may be.” (footnote omitted)). 
 20 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (“[C]ustodial interrogation . . . mean[s] questioning initiated by law 
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action 
in any significant way.”). Law enforcement officers and their agents are not required to give Miranda 
warnings when the person being interrogated is unaware that he is being questioned by a law enforcement 
officer. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 294 (1990). Questioning by undercover agents does not implicate 
Miranda concerns because no coercion exists when the person being questioned is unaware that he is being 
questioned by law enforcement. Id. at 296. 
 21 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363, 1369 (Mass. 1992) (“The Miranda rule does not 
apply to a . . . school administrator who is acting neither as an instrument of the police nor as an agent of the 
police pursuant to a scheme to elicit statements from the defendant by coercion or guile.”). Private actors who 
act independently of law enforcement are not required to give Miranda warnings, even though their 
questioning may help law enforcement. See State v. Etheridge, 352 S.E.2d 673, 679 (N.C. 1987) 
(“[S]tatements made to private individuals unconnected with law enforcement are admissible so long as they 
were made freely and voluntarily.”). 
 22 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334, 336 (1985) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment protects the 
rights of students against encroachment by public school officials . . . . In carrying out searches and other 
disciplinary functions pursuant to such policies, school officials act as representatives of the State . . . .”). 
Courts sometimes make the mistake of referring to school officials as private actors, but this label is incorrect. 
See, e.g., People v. Butler, 725 N.Y.S.2d 534, 540–41 (Sup. Ct. 2001) (“A [d]ean interrogating a student on 
school grounds on a matter of school discipline—even a matter that would carry criminal sanctions—is still a 
private individual, with respect to whose questioning Miranda is inapplicable.” (emphasis added)). 
 23 See K.L. v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 644U, at 6–7, 2010 WL 3769277, at *3–4 (holding that school 
principals are not law enforcement officers); In re Corey L., 250 Cal. Rptr. 359, 361 (Ct. App. 1988) 
(“Questioning of a student by a principal, whose duties include the obligations to maintain order, protect the 
health and safety of pupils and maintain conditions conducive to learning, cannot be equated with custodial 
interrogation by law enforcement officers.”). 
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Miranda warnings when they alone question students for disciplinary 
reasons.24 
B. Protecting the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination 
1. Miranda v. Arizona and Its Progeny 
The Supreme Court in Miranda sought to protect an individual’s Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination during custodial 
interrogations.25 Recognizing that police interrogations can contain “inherently 
compelling pressures,”26 the Court was concerned with the way interrogations 
occur—they are conducted in isolation,27 they are psychologically oriented,28 
and they sometimes involve trickery.29 Because the sole purpose of an 
interrogation is “to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner,”30 the 
Court opined that an interrogation “carries its own badge of intimidation.”31 To 
protect an individual’s privilege against self-incrimination, the Miranda Court 
imposed procedural requirements on law enforcement that must be followed 
before law enforcement ask questions during custodial interrogation.32 
These procedural protections require law enforcement officers to warn an 
individual of his Miranda rights before initiating questioning in a custodial 
setting.33 Law enforcement must warn the individual that he has the right to 
remain silent and that, if he chooses not to remain silent, what he says can be 
used against him in court.34 Additionally, law enforcement must inform the 
individual that he has the right to legal counsel prior to questioning and the 
right to have legal counsel present during any questioning.35 Miranda also 
 
 24 Snyder, 597 N.E.2d at 1369 (“There is no authority requiring a school administrator not acting on 
behalf of law enforcement officials to furnish Miranda warnings.”). 
 25 384 U.S. at 444. The Fifth Amendment reads that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 26 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. 
 27 Id. at 449. 
 28 Id. at 448. 
 29 Id. at 453. 
 30 Id. at 457. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at 467–73. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 467–69. 
 35 Id. at 469–70. 
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requires law enforcement to explain to the individual that an attorney will be 
appointed for him if he wants an attorney but cannot afford to hire one.36 
Once Miranda rights have been read, an individual may choose to 
“voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently” waive these rights and proceed to 
answer law enforcement’s questions.37 However, if Miranda warnings are not 
read, any statements made during the custodial interrogation will be 
inadmissible during the prosecutor’s case-in-chief.38 Similarly, if a custodial 
suspect initially waives his Miranda rights but later decides to invoke his 
rights, all questioning must cease.39 Any statements made after the suspect has 
invoked his rights are inadmissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief.40 
More than twenty years after its Miranda opinion, the Supreme Court 
explicitly extended Miranda’s privilege against self-incrimination to 
adolescents.41 In In re Gault, the Court opined that confessions from 
adolescents require “special caution.”42 Explaining that adolescents need 
procedural safeguards during custodial interrogation, the In re Gault Court 
pointed to its reasoning in Haley v. Ohio.43 In Haley, the Court stated that an 
 
 36 Id. at 479. 
 37 Id. at 444. Whether a suspect’s statement constitutes a valid waiver of his Miranda rights is outside the 
scope of this Comment. Courts assess whether a waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent based on a 
totality-of-the-circumstances test. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724–25 (1979). The factors relevant in 
this totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry include the suspect’s age, intelligence, background, education, 
experience with the justice system, and capacity to understand the Miranda rights and the consequences of 
waiving these rights. Id. at 725. 
 38 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. The language in Miranda provides that “unless and until such warnings and 
waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be 
used against [the defendant].” Id. Despite this seemingly broad prohibition, the Court in Harris v. New York 
stated that this language was not necessary to the Court’s holding and therefore could not be regarded as 
controlling. 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971). The Court in Harris held that when a defendant chooses to testify at 
trial, he can be impeached by his own statements to police even if the statements were taken in violation of 
Miranda. Id. at 226. 
 39 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444–45. 
 40 Id. at 444. 
 41 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967). 
 42 Id. at 45. 
 43 Id. at 45–46; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (plurality opinion). In Haley, the Court reversed a 
murder conviction against a fifteen-year-old, holding that the police officer violated the child’s Fifth 
Amendment due process rights by questioning him in isolation from midnight until dawn. Id. at 598–601. The 
Court held that the resulting confession could not be used, explaining as follows: 
The age of [the child], the hours when he was grilled, the duration of his quizzing, the fact that he 
had no friend or counsel to advise him, [and] the callous attitude of the police towards his rights 
combine to convince us that this was a confession wrung from a child by means which the law 
should not sanction. 
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adolescent “cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity. That 
which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a 
lad in his early teens.”44 The Court in Haley was concerned that adolescents’ 
vulnerability, combined with coercive police tactics, would lead adolescents to 
incriminate themselves.45 Echoing this concern, the Court in In re Gault 
recognized that adolescents need safeguards because a “distrust of confessions 
made in certain situations . . . is imperative in the case of [adolescents].”46 
2. Defining Custodial Interrogation 
While the Miranda opinion created new protections for criminal suspects, 
its holding applies only to people who are interrogated by law enforcement in a 
custodial setting.47 For the court to find that custodial interrogation occurred, 
law enforcement must have initiated the questioning after the person was 
formally arrested or “otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way.”48 In Berkemer v. McCarty, the Court further defined 
“deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way” to mean that the 
individual’s movement must have been restricted to a degree akin to formal 
arrest.49 If a court finds that custodial interrogation occurred and Miranda 
warnings were not administered, any statements made by a suspect are 
inadmissible during the prosecution’s case-in-chief against the suspect.50 
Courts use an objective, two-part inquiry to determine whether an 
individual was in custody at the time of the questioning.51 First, courts look at 
 
Id. at 600–01. 
 44 Haley, 332 U.S. at 599. 
 45 See id. at 599–600. 
 46 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 48 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 47 Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (per curiam). For Miranda warnings to be 
implicated, an individual must be (1) in custody and (2) interrogated. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 
298 (1980) (holding that it was uncontested that the suspect was in custody and that the only issue was whether 
the suspect was interrogated). “Interrogation” in the Miranda context includes express questioning and “any 
words or actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response from the suspect.” Id. at 301 (footnote omitted). This Comment focuses solely on the 
custody analysis. 
 48 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
 49 See 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984). The Berkemer custody test refines the Miranda Court’s original 
definition of custody. 
 50 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. Statements obtained in violation of Miranda are admissible to impeach the 
suspect at trial. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (holding that the privilege to testify in one’s 
own defense “cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury”). 
 51 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2402 (2011). 
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all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.52 Courts conducting a 
custody analysis will consider many non-determinative factors including, but 
not limited to: (1) the time, location, and purpose of the encounter; (2) the 
people present during the questioning; (3) the interaction between the officer 
and the suspect, including any words spoken to the suspect by the officer; (4) 
the officer’s tone and demeanor; (5) the length of the interrogation; and (6) 
whether the suspect was restrained or experienced any restrictions on his 
movement.53 Second, courts ask, given the circumstances, “would a reasonable 
person have felt he or she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and 
leave”?54 Because courts use an objective, reasonable person standard, courts 
do not consider the subjective mindset of the person being questioned.55 
The Supreme Court’s decision in J.D.B. v. North Carolina significantly 
altered the Miranda custody analysis as it applies to adolescents.56 In J.D.B., 
the Court held that the defendant’s age should be considered when determining 
whether custodial interrogation occurred.57 The Court stated that while custody 
should still be gauged using an objective test, the defendant’s age should be 
included in that analysis as long as the defendant’s age was known to the 
officer at the time of questioning or “would have been objectively apparent to a 
reasonable officer.”58 
J.D.B. is a landmark holding because it expands the custody analysis to 
offer broader protections for adolescents’ privilege against self-incrimination.59 
Before J.D.B., adolescents were at risk because the custody analysis did not 
reflect the reality that adolescents are developmentally different from adults. 
The J.D.B. Court recognized that failing to consider age is “nonsensical” in 
 
 52 Id.; Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 322. 
 53 See, e.g., People v. Holt, 233 P.3d 1194, 1197 (Colo. 2010) (en banc); R.D.S. v. State, 245 S.W.3d 
356, 364 (Tenn. 2008). 
 54 J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2402. 
 55 Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323. The interrogator’s subjective intent as to custody is irrelevant except when 
it is communicated to the target. Id. at 325. 
 56 See 131 S. Ct. at 2408. 
 57 Id. Prior to this decision, the Court had declined to alter the objective, reasonable person standard to 
include age as a factor. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 668 (2004). In Yarborough, the Court 
considered whether a seventeen-year-old was in custody when questioned by law enforcement. Id. Affirming 
the state court’s finding that the defendant was not in custody, the majority declined to consider the 
defendant’s age. Id. In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor left open the possibility that the defendant’s age 
would sometimes be relevant to the custody analysis, but said that in the particular case at hand, the failure to 
consider age was not pivotal because the defendant was almost eighteen years old. Id. at 669 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
 58 J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2406. 
 59 See id. at 2408. 
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many cases involving adolescent suspects because “[n]either officers nor 
courts can reasonably evaluate the effect of objective circumstances that, by 
their nature, are specific to children without accounting for the age of the child 
subjected to those circumstances.”60 
Despite the Court’s landmark holding in J.D.B., adolescents need 
additional protections when they are interrogated at school in the presence of 
law enforcement. The facts of J.D.B. illustrate the reasons for this. Police first 
questioned J.D.B.—a thirteen-year-old, seventh-grade boy—away from school 
property about his involvement in home break-ins.61 A few days later, police 
received information that one of the stolen items from the break-ins had been 
found at J.D.B.’s school and seen in his possession.62 Instead of questioning 
J.D.B. at his home with his legal guardian present, police officers confronted 
and questioned him at school.63 J.D.B. was removed from his classroom by a 
police officer and taken to a conference room.64 
Inside the conference room, J.D.B. was questioned by four adults—two 
police officers and two school officials—about his involvement in the home 
break-ins.65 The questioning took at least half an hour.66 J.D.B. was not given 
Miranda warnings and was not given the opportunity to speak with his legal 
guardian or with counsel, nor was he informed that he was free to leave the 
room.67 
During the questioning, the assistant principal told J.D.B. to “do the right 
thing” because “the truth always comes out in the end.”68 One police officer 
applied pressure by telling J.D.B. that he might be sent to juvenile detention.69 
Upon learning that he might be sent to juvenile detention, J.D.B. confessed to 
the crime.70 At this point in the questioning, the officer told J.D.B. he did not 
have to answer questions and could leave if he wanted.71 Ultimately J.D.B. was 
 
 60 Id. at 2405. 
 61 Id. at 2399. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 2400. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
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allowed to ride the bus home that day, but he was later charged with breaking 
and entering and larceny.72 
On the basis of these facts, the Supreme Court reversed the North Carolina 
Supreme Court’s holding that J.D.B. was delinquent and remanded the custody 
question back to the state court.73 The Court ordered that on remand the state 
court must consider all of the relevant circumstances of the interrogation 
setting, including J.D.B.’s age at the time.74 The Court opined that the 
defendant’s age is relevant to the custody analysis because “[i]n some 
circumstances, a child’s age ‘would have affected how a reasonable person’ in 
the suspect’s position ‘would perceive his or her freedom to leave.’”75 The 
Court reasoned that adolescents and adults will often experience police 
questioning differently, causing adolescents to feel compelled to respond even 
though adults subjected to the same interrogation would feel free to leave.76 
The J.D.B. Court’s decision to incorporate age into the custody analysis has 
opened the door for lower courts to reevaluate their approach to custody in the 
school interrogation context. Now that J.D.B. has set the stage for considering 
age as relevant to custody, courts should take the next logical step and alter 
their custody analyses to reflect the coerciveness of school interrogations when 
law enforcement is present. 
C. Lower Courts Grappling with Custodial Interrogation in School Settings 
Before J.D.B., lower courts engaged in cursory custody analyses, relying 
on legal conclusions instead of analyzing each fact pattern for signs of 
coercion. Accordingly, this section highlights some of these lower court 
decisions and argues that courts need to alter their custody determinations in 
light of J.D.B. 
In general, there are four school interrogation scenarios: (1) school officials 
question students independently, and law enforcement is not present or 
involved; (2) law enforcement is present during the questioning but does not 
speak or otherwise participate; (3) law enforcement is involved in the 
questioning but makes a minimal contribution; and (4) law enforcement 
actively participates in the questioning with the school official. This Comment 
 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 2408. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 2402–03 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 325 (1994) (per curiam)). 
 76 Id. at 2398–99. 
NORTH GALLEYSPROOFS2 2/19/2013 10:02 AM 
454 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:441 
focuses only on school interrogation scenarios involving law enforcement 
because courts have generally held that when a school official questions a 
student alone, the student’s statements are admissible in court because the 
school official, although a state actor, is not considered law enforcement under 
the Fifth Amendment.77 
When school officials question students in the presence of law 
enforcement, instead of alone, the custody analysis becomes much murkier. 
Courts have generally found custody exists only when (1) school officials act 
as agents or instruments of law enforcement78 or (2) law enforcement actively 
participates in the questioning.79 Typically, courts will find that no custodial 
interrogation occurred when (1) law enforcement is merely present during the 
interrogation80 or (2) law enforcement’s contribution to the questioning is 
minimal.81 When courts find that no custodial interrogation occurred, the 
factual analysis is surprisingly thin and rarely includes consideration of how a 
reasonable person in the student’s situation would experience the encounter.82 
Instead, courts simply resort to legal conclusions, opining that the mere 
presence of law enforcement during questioning is not enough to transform the 
interaction into custodial interrogation.83 This Comment proposes that courts 
need to reevaluate this distinction between a law enforcement officer’s mere 
presence and active participation. It also argues that a law enforcement 
officer’s mere presence turns the questioning into custodial interrogation. 
1. Factors in Support of a Custody Finding 
Lower courts that addressed school interrogation issues before J.D.B. 
generally held that custodial interrogation exists in two circumstances: (1) 
when school officials act as agents of law enforcement84 or (2) when law 
enforcement actively participates in the questioning.85 Courts rarely have 
 
 77 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. A strong argument could be made that the coercive aspects 
of the school setting are enough to implicate Miranda even when a school official is interrogating a student 
alone. However, that topic is outside the scope of this Comment. 
 78 See infra Part I.C.1. 
 79 See infra Part I.C.1. 
 80 See infra Part I.C.2. 
 81 See infra Part I.C.2. 
 82 See infra note 123. 
 83 See infra note 123. 
 84 See, e.g., In re T.A.G., 663 S.E.2d 392 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). 
 85 See, e.g., In re Killitz, 651 P.2d 1382, 1383–84 (Or. Ct. App. 1982); State v. D.R., 930 P.2d 350, 351–
53 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). 
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found that school officials are agents of law enforcement.86 One case in which 
a court did find agency was In re T.A.G.87 In that case, the school official asked 
for the law enforcement officer’s advice and guidance during questioning, and 
the adolescent was questioned by a school administrator in the presence of the 
officer.88 Although the police officer did not ask any questions, he did advise 
the assistant principal, in T.A.G.’s presence, what criminal charges T.A.G. 
could face.89 
Other facts suggested agency: the school administrator conferred with the 
officer about what questions she should ask in the interview, the school 
administrator told the officer not to ask questions because they both knew that 
could implicate Miranda warnings, and the results of the assistant principal’s 
investigation were turned over to the police.90 Once the trial court determined 
that the school administrator was an agent of law enforcement, the court 
concluded that T.A.G. was in custody because a reasonable person in T.A.G.’s 
situation would not have thought that he was free to leave,91 a conclusion 
affirmed by the appellate court.92 
Some courts have held that custodial interrogation occurs when law 
enforcement actively participates in the questioning of students.93 In In re 
Welfare of G.S.P., for example, a school custodian found a backpack that 
contained a BB gun.94 The custodian turned the bag over to the assistant 
principal, who then determined that the backpack belonged to G.S.P., a twelve-
 
 86 In the school interrogation context, agency is an extremely high threshold. See, e.g., In re Navajo Cnty. 
Juvenile Action No. JV91000058, 901 P.2d 1247, 1249 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (concluding that the school 
official was not an agent of law enforcement despite his intention to report the fruits of his investigation 
directly to police); State v. J.T.D., 851 So. 2d 793, 795–96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the assistant 
principal was not an agent of law enforcement even though the assistant principal and law enforcement officer 
shared information before the assistant principal conducted the interrogation). 
 87 663 S.E.2d 392. 
 88 Id. at 393. This was actually the second time that T.A.G. was interviewed. During the first interview, 
in which T.A.G. was questioned only by a school administrator, he confessed to robbing a fellow student. Id. 
at 394. The juvenile court denied suppression of this statement because the law enforcement officer was not 
involved in the questioning. Id. 
 89 Id. at 393. 
 90 Id. at 395. 
 91 Id. at 395–96. 
 92 Id. at 396. 
 93 See, e.g., In re Killitz, 651 P.2d 1382, 1383–84 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (finding that the adolescent was in 
custody when the police officer conducted the questioning with the principal in the room); State v. D.R., 930 
P.2d 350, 351–53 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the adolescent was in custody when questioned by a 
police officer in the presence of an assistant principal and a social worker because the police officer facilitated 
the interrogation and asked questions in an accusatory manner). 
 94 610 N.W.2d 651, 653 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000). 
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year-old boy.95 The assistant principal and a police officer took G.S.P. from his 
classroom and escorted him to the assistant principal’s office.96 G.S.P. “was 
not told why he was called out of class and felt he had no choice but to 
accompany them.”97 
Once inside the office, G.S.P. was questioned by both the assistant 
principal and the police officer.98 During the questioning, the assistant 
principal told G.S.P. “that he had no choice but to answer the questions.”99 The 
police officer told G.S.P. that the questioning would be tape-recorded.100 The 
assistant principal and police officer jointly told the boy that they found a BB 
gun in his backpack and explained the school discipline and criminal charges 
he was facing.101 Thereafter, G.S.P. made self-incriminating statements, telling 
the assistant principal and the police officer that the gun was his and that he 
had accidently brought it to school.102 
The trial court refused to suppress G.S.P.’s statements, holding that he was 
not in custody and thus was not entitled to Miranda warnings.103 The appellate 
court reversed, determining that G.S.P. was in custody when questioned by 
both the assistant principal and police officer.104 The court opined that the 
police officer had actively participated in the questioning and that “the 
circumstances suggest[ed] the coercive influence associated with a formal 
arrest.”105 
2. Factors Influencing a No-Custody Finding 
Before J.D.B., lower courts often held that custodial interrogation does not 
occur if (1) law enforcement is merely present but remains silent during 
questioning106 or (2) law enforcement is mostly silent and makes only minimal 
 
 95 Id. at 653–54. 
 96 Id. at 654. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. A counselor and teacher were also present during the questioning. Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 654–55. 
 102 Id. at 655. 
 103 Id. at 653. 
 104 Id. at 657–58. 
 105 Id. at 658. 
 106 See, e.g., State v. J.T.D., 851 So. 2d 793, 796 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (finding no custodial 
interrogation when the student was questioned by the principal and assistant principal in the presence of the 
school resource officer, who did not ask any questions); see also infra note 123. But see In re K.D.L., 700 
S.E.2d 766 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010). The court in In re K.D.L. held that a twelve-year-old student was in custody 
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contributions during questioning.107 Consider, for example, the case J.D. v. 
Commonwealth, in which a fourteen-year-old boy was questioned about a 
series of thefts that had occurred at the school.108 J.D. was pulled out of class, 
taken to the assistant principal’s office, and questioned by the assistant 
principal.109 The principal and the school resource officer were also present 
during the questioning.110 The school resource officer did not participate in the 
questioning and did not confer with the assistant principal prior to the 
questioning about what questions the assistant principal should ask or possible 
criminal charges pending against J.D.111 
The trial court determined that the assistant principal was not acting in the 
capacity of law enforcement during the questioning.112 The court found that 
J.D. was not in custody during the questioning, despite testimony from both the 
assistant principal and J.D. that pointed to the opposite conclusion.113 The 
assistant principal testified that a student could be disciplined if he refused to 
obey school officials.114 J.D.’s testimony confirmed that this threat of 
discipline restricted his movement—he testified that he believed he had to go 
to the assistant principal’s office and cooperate or else he would be 
disciplined.115 Notwithstanding this testimony, the appellate court affirmed the 
trial court’s decision, opining that the mere presence of the police officer did 
not turn the questioning into custodial interrogation.116 The court concluded 
that there was no evidence of coercion on the part of the school administrators 
because J.D. had not been expressly threatened with disciplinary action.117 
 
when questioned at school by a principal in the presence of a police officer because of the interrogation’s other 
highly coercive factors. Id. at 772. Although the police officer was merely present during questioning, the 
student was questioned for five to six hours, frisked, and transported in a police car. Id. These coercive factors 
led the court to determine that the interrogation was functionally equivalent to an arrest. Id. 
 107 See infra notes 118–19 and accompanying text. 
 108 591 S.E.2d 721, 723 (Va. Ct. App. 2004). 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. School resource officers are usually police officers who have been placed in schools to perform 
traditional law enforcement functions along with other duties, such as teaching and counseling. See Michael 
Pinard, From the Classroom to the Courtroom: Reassessing Fourth Amendment Standards in Public School 
Searches Involving Law Enforcement Authorities, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1067, 1077–78 (2003). 
 111 J.D., 591 S.E.2d at 723. 
 112 Id. at 725. 
 113 Id. at 723. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 725. 
 117 Id. at 727. 
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Some lower courts have refused to find custody even when there was some 
participation by law enforcement in the questioning process, as long as the 
school official dominated the interrogation.118 One example is M.H. v. State, in 
which a school official questioned M.H., a seventh-grader, in the presence of a 
school resource officer.119 The school official asked all of the questions but 
one.120 The trial court distinguished the statements M.H. made to the school 
official from the statement he made to the school resource officer, holding that 
the statements M.H. made to the school official were admissible.121 Only the 
lone statement M.H. made to the school resource officer was suppressed.122 
The appellate court affirmed—without considering the effect of the resource 
officer’s presence—stating that “[t]he mere presence of a law enforcement 
officer, when a student is being questioned by a school official, does not 
amount to a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings.”123 
In In re J.C., a case with similar facts to M.H. v. State, the court held that 
none of the student’s statements needed to be suppressed because the police 
officer remained mostly silent during the student’s interrogation.124 The police 
officer was present while an assistant principal questioned J.C. about smoking 
marijuana on school property.125 The police officer may have also asked one or 
two questions during the interrogation.126 Despite the police officer’s 
participation, the trial court failed to consider the coercive effect this would 
have on a reasonable person in J.C.’s situation.127 The appellate court affirmed 
 
 118 See, e.g., In re Tateana R., 883 N.Y.S.2d 476, 478 (App. Div. 2009) (holding that minimal input by the 
police officer was not enough to turn the interview into custodial interrogation); State v. Schloegel, 2009 WI 
App 85, ¶¶ 10–12, 769 N.W.2d 130, 133–34 (holding that the student was not in custody when the 
interrogation was conducted primarily by the assistant principal even though two police officers were present 
during questioning and one officer asked a few questions). 
 119 851 So. 2d 233, 233 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. at 233–34. Lower court decisions addressing the custody analysis in the school interrogation 
context are full of legal conclusions lacking any analysis of whether coercive aspects existed when police 
officers were present during questioning. See, e.g., In re J.C., 591 So. 2d 315, 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) 
(stating that “if the policeman stands mute and does not participate, his mere presence does not” create a 
custodial interrogation); In re Drolshagen, 310 S.E.2d 927, 927 (S.C. 1984) (opining that the questioning was 
not transformed into a custodial interrogation “[m]erely because the questioning took place in the principal’s 
office, in the presence of police officers”). 
 124 591 So. 2d at 316. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. (“[T]he trial judge here was apparently satisfied that the deputy’s contribution was de 
minimis . . . .”). 
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the trial court’s holding that the police officer’s contribution was minimal and 
did not create a custodial interrogation.128 
Lower courts that distinguish between an officer’s mere presence and his 
active participation fail to adequately consider the adolescent student’s 
perspective on the interrogation. These decisions are typically marked by a 
lack of analytical depth, as courts seem unwilling to analyze each individual 
fact pattern for signs of coercion.129 Instead of considering adolescents’ 
developmental immaturity and how their responses are affected when law 
enforcement is present during interrogations at school, lower courts rely on 
legal conclusions—stating that law enforcement’s mere presence in the room is 
not enough to turn the questioning into custodial interrogation.130 
This Comment takes issue with the lower courts’ distinction between law 
enforcement’s mere presence and active participation. From a reasonable 
adolescent’s perspective, the mere presence of law enforcement during 
questioning creates apprehension and fear.131 It turns the public school setting 
into a coercive environment that the student reasonably would believe he is not 
allowed to leave. Adolescents are uniquely susceptible in school interrogation 
settings when both law enforcement and school officials are present, regardless 
of whether the law enforcement officer actively participates in the questioning. 
Therefore, the mere presence of a law enforcement officer at a student 
interrogation transforms the encounter into a custodial interrogation, and 
Miranda warnings must be given. 
II. ADOLESCENTS’ VULNERABILITY TO INTERROGATIONS 
Within the last ten years, the Supreme Court has demonstrated its 
willingness to extend special protections to adolescents.132 In doing so, the 
Court has pointed to social science research that demonstrates stark differences 
 
 128 Id. The court limited its holding by stating, “We would stress that this opinion is limited to the facts 
and circumstances of this particular case. As a general rule, where a student is detained . . . and a law 
enforcement officer participates in the interrogation, Miranda warnings should be given . . . .” Id. at 316. 
 129 See supra note 123. Given that custody is judged according to a totality-of-the-circumstances test, it is 
remarkable that courts can analyze school interrogations so briefly. See, e.g., M.H. v. State, 851 So. 2d 233, 
233–34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (devoting less than a paragraph to the custody analysis); In re J.C., 591 So. 
2d at 316 (assessing the police officer’s contribution to the interrogation in one paragraph); In re Drolshagen, 
310 S.E.2d 927, 927 (S.C. 1984) (addressing the custody analysis in three sentences). 
 130 See supra note 123. 
 131 See Paul Holland, Schooling Miranda: Policing Interrogation in the Twenty-First Century 
Schoolhouse, 52 LOY. L. REV. 39, 65 (2006). 
 132 See infra Part II.A. 
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between the development of adolescents and adults.133 The Supreme Court’s 
acceptance of these studies in Roper v. Simmons,134 Graham v. Florida,135 and 
J.D.B. v. North Carolina136 shows the Court’s recognition that adolescents are 
uniquely vulnerable and need special protections from state actors and state 
policies. 
This Part first discusses the Court’s use of social science studies and then 
explores these studies with respect to adolescents’ vulnerability in 
interrogation settings. Part II.B asserts that adolescents are vulnerable in 
interrogation settings for three main reasons: (1) adolescents are more likely to 
falsely confess; (2) adolescents make immature decisions because they have a 
natural risk-weighing handicap and they are present-oriented; and (3) 
adolescents show a strong propensity to comply with authority figures. 
A. The Supreme Court’s Recent Tendency to Cite Scientific Findings 
In Roper, the Court pointed to scientific and sociological findings when it 
opined that adolescents should be treated differently than adults in the death 
penalty context.137 Relying on these studies, the Court reasoned that 
adolescents lack maturity, have an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, are 
more susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, and have 
characters less developed than adults.138 In striking down the death penalty for 
adolescents, the Roper Court found the differences between adolescents and 
adults too overwhelming to ignore.139 
Five years later in Graham, the Court cited the opinion in Roper referring 
to the scientific studies and noted that “[n]o recent data provide reason to 
reconsider the Court’s observations in Roper about the nature of 
[adolescents].”140 The Court held that the punishment of life without parole 
was not justified as a deterrent for adolescents who had not committed 
homicide because adolescents’ “lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility . . . often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and 
 
 133 See infra Part II.A. 
 134 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 135 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
 136 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011). 
 137 543 U.S. at 569. 
 138 Id. at 569–70. 
 139 Id. at 572–73. 
 140 130 S. Ct. at 2026. 
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decisions.”141 The Court concluded that adolescents, unlike adults, should not 
be sentenced to life without parole for any crime other than homicide.142 
In J.D.B., the Court confirmed that the developmental differences between 
adolescents and adults were relevant to the Miranda custody analysis.143 
Drawing from the studies cited in Roper and Graham, the Court stated that 
“[t]he law has historically reflected the . . . assumption that children 
characteristically lack the capacity to exercise mature judgment and possess 
only an incomplete ability to understand the world around them.”144 
The Court in J.D.B. also highlighted recent studies that have found high 
numbers of false confessions by adolescents.145 In holding that age is relevant 
to the Miranda custody analysis, the Court opined that “[i]t is beyond dispute 
that children will often feel bound to submit to police questioning when an 
adult in the same circumstances would feel free to leave.”146 The Court stated 
that this was a “commonsense reality.”147 
This commonsense reality—that adolescents are developmentally different 
than adults and deserve additional protection—has yet to translate into 
additional protection for adolescents who are interrogated in school settings by 
school officials and law enforcement. Research revealing adolescents’ 
susceptibility to make false confessions,148 underdeveloped ability to make 
mature judgments,149 and propensity to comply with authority figures150 should 
 
 141 Id. at 2028 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 142 Id. at 2034. This reasoning was later used by the Court in Miller v. Alabama to strike down life-
without-parole sentences for adolescents who had committed homicide. 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012) (“[N]one 
of what it said about children—about their distinctive (and transitory) mental traits and environmental 
vulnerabilities—is crime-specific. . . . So Graham’s reasoning implicates any life-without-parole sentence 
imposed on a juvenile, even as its categorical bar relates only to nonhomicide offenses.”). 
 143 See 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2398–99 (2011). 
 144 Id. at 2403. The J.D.B. Court cited overwhelming precedent to support its statement that the law 
cannot treat adolescents the same way that it treats adults. The Court opined that adolescents are “most 
susceptible to influence.” Id. at 2405 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the Court stated, adolescents “often lack the experience, perspective, 
and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them.” Id. at 2397 (quoting Bellotti 
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (plurality opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 145 Id. at 2401 (citing Brief of Ctr. on Wrongful Convictions of Youth, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Petitioner at 21–22, J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. 2394 (No. 09-11121)). 
 146 Id. at 2398–99. 
 147 Id. at 2399. 
 148 See infra Part II.B.1. 
 149 See infra Part II.B.2. 
 150 See infra Part II.B.3. 
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push courts to reconsider the custody analysis from the perspective of an 
adolescent student. 
B. Scientific Findings About the Susceptibility of Adolescents 
1. Adolescents’ Vulnerability to Make False Confessions 
Perhaps the most compelling example of adolescents’ vulnerability in 
interrogations is the frequency with which adolescents falsely confess to 
crimes. A number of recent studies have focused on adolescents’ susceptibility 
to make false confessions.151 These studies all come to the same conclusion: 
“[Y]outh are particularly likely to react to pressure-filled interrogation by 
falsely confessing.”152 
The correlation between adolescence and false confessions was highlighted 
by Joshua Tepfer and his colleagues in a study of exonerees and the basis for 
their exoneration.153 Tepfer’s data showed that 31.1% of the youth exonerees 
secured their exoneration on the basis of a false confession.154 Most of these 
false confessions occurred during police questioning.155 In contrast, only 
17.8% of adults who were exonerated had falsely confessed.156 Tepfer and his 
colleagues attributed this stark difference between adults and adolescents to the 
 
 151 See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 523, 544–45 (2005). Gross and his colleagues collected data on adolescents (those under the age 
of eighteen) and adults who had been exonerated between 1989 and 2003. Id. at 523. The data collected 
showed that 42% of the exonerated adolescents had falsely confessed compared to only 13% of adult 
exonerees. Id. at 545. The rates were even higher among the youngest adolescents: 69% of twelve- to fifteen-
year-old exonorees falsely confessed. Id.; see also Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk 
Factors and Recommendations, 34 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 19 (2010) (stating that there is a “staggering 
overrepresentation of [adolescents] in the population of proven false confessions”); Allison D. Redlich, The 
Susceptibility of Juveniles to False Confessions and False Guilty Pleas, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 943, 952 (2010) 
(“Juveniles are over-represented in proven false confession cases, typically accounting for about one-third of 
the samples.”). 
 152 Joshua A. Tepfer et al., Arresting Development: Convictions of Innocent Youth, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 
887, 893 (2010); accord supra note 151. 
 153 Tepfer et al., supra note 152, at 904. For the purposes of this study, an individual was considered a 
youth if he was under the age of twenty when he was wrongfully accused. Id. at 896. The study shows a 
correlation between age and false confession rates. Id. at 904. The younger the adolescent, the more likely the 
adolescent will falsely confess. Id. 
 154 Id. at 904. 
 155 Id. The study showed that thirty of the thirty-two adolescents who gave false confessions did so during 
police questioning. Id. 
 156 Id. 
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fact that “children’s brains are wired such that they think and make decisions 
about the world differently than older persons.”157 
A study on false confessions performed by Steven Drizin and Richard Leo 
also led them to conclude that adolescents are more vulnerable than adults to 
the pressures of interrogation and thus are more likely to succumb to coercive 
interrogation methods.158 Adolescents under the age of eighteen were prevalent 
in Drizin and Leo’s database of false confession cases.159 In fact, false 
confessions by adolescents constituted about one-third of the total false 
confessions identified during the study.160 These studies show that adolescents 
are extremely vulnerable during general police interrogations, resulting in a 
devastatingly high number of false confessions in the adolescent exoneree 
population161 
2. Adolescents’ Brain Development Shows Immaturity of Judgment 
Neuroscientific evidence, which has garnered the Court’s support in recent 
years, raises questions about adolescents’ abilities to make mature decisions 
when interrogated.162 Recent brain development studies conducted by 
neuroscientists and developmental psychologists demonstrate the remarkable 
difference between the development of adolescent and adult brains.163 
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) technology has produced images that 
enable scientists to more effectively study brain development.164 These MRI 
images show that adolescents’ brains undergo huge transformations, and that 
these changes affect judgment.165 
Perhaps most importantly, the prefrontal cortex, which is the area of the 
brain that operates as the “chief executive,” is not fully developed until 
 
 157 Id. at 892. 
 158 Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 
N.C. L. REV. 891, 919 (2004); see also Saul M. Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of 
Confessions: A Review of the Literature and Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 33, 52 (2004) (“It is clear that 
juvenile suspects are highly vulnerable to false confessions, particularly when interrogated by police and other 
figures of authority.”). 
 159 Drizin & Leo, supra note 158, at 944. 
 160 Id. 
 161 See, e.g., id. 
 162 See BARBARA STRAUCH, THE PRIMAL TEEN: WHAT THE NEW DISCOVERIES ABOUT THE TEENAGE 
BRAIN TELL US ABOUT OUR KIDS (2003); infra note 163 and text accompanying notes 163, 165–66. 
 163 See, e.g., Jay N. Giedd, Structural Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the Adolescent Brain, 1021 
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 77, 83 (2004). 
 164 See, e.g., id. at 78. 
 165 STRAUCH, supra note 162, at 15, 19–20. 
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adulthood.166 Neuroscientist Peter R. Huttenlocher found that this gradual 
development of the “[m]ore complex executive functions of [the] prefrontal 
cortex” affects adolescents’ “reasoning, motivation and judgment.”167 The 
slow maturation of the prefrontal cortex affects judgment because it “is linked 
to the ability to inhibit impulses, weigh consequences of decisions, prioritize, 
and strategize.”168 
Underdeveloped judgment makes adolescents more susceptible in 
interrogation settings because adolescents cannot properly understand the 
situation and weigh their options.169 This section highlights two specific 
aspects of judgment that are underdeveloped in adolescents: (1) the ability to 
identify and weigh risks and (2) the ability to take into account long-term 
consequences. 
Analysis of adolescents’ brain development has revealed that adolescents 
have a natural risk-weighing handicap.170 In his article, Risk Taking in 
Adolescence, Laurence Steinberg detailed from a developmental neuroscience 
perspective why adolescents have difficulty weighing the risks in a given 
situation.171 During adolescence, two different core areas of the brain vie for 
control—the socio-emotional network that handles how humans perceive 
rewards and the cognitive-control network that is responsible for weighing 
risks.172 Steinberg states that the cognitive-control network takes longer to 
mature and can often be overwhelmed by the socio-emotional network, which 
 
 166 Id. at 16; accord L.P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral Manifestations, 24 
NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REV. 417, 439 (2000). The prefrontal cortex is the brain’s chief executive 
because it performs essential functions such as “response inhibition, emotional regulation, planning and 
organization.” Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence for Post-Adolescent Brain Maturation in Frontal 
and Striatal Regions, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 859, 860 (1999). The prefrontal cortex also assesses risk, 
evaluates reward and punishment, and controls impulses. See Brief for the Am. Med. Ass’n & the Am. Acad. 
of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 16–17, Graham v. Florida, 
130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621). 
 167 STRAUCH, supra note 162, at 20 (second alteration in original) (quoting another source); accord Giedd, 
supra note 163, at 83 (stating that the prefrontal cortex matures last and does not reach adult levels until the 
individual reaches his twenties). 
 168 Giedd, supra note 163, at 83. See generally Marty Beyer, Immaturity, Culpability & Competency in 
Juveniles: A Study of 17 Cases, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2000, at 26 (analyzing the maturity of seventeen 
adolescent delinquents using a developmental perspective). 
 169 See Kim Taylor-Thompson, States of Mind/States of Development, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 143, 143 
(2003) (“[A]dolescent decision-making bears little resemblance to the mental operation that adults—and adult 
courts—treat as typical.”). 
 170 See Spear, supra note 166, at 420–21. 
 171 Laurence Steinberg, Risk Taking in Adolescence: New Perspectives from Brain and Behavioral 
Science, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 55, 56 (2007). 
 172 Id. 
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develops more quickly.173 Therefore, when adolescents become emotionally 
excited, the perceived rewards are in the forefront of their minds.174 
In a study comparing the decision-making ability of adolescents and young 
adults, Bonnie Halpern-Felsher and Elizabeth Cauffman found that adults were 
more likely than adolescents to consider the risks associated with their 
decisions.175 The results of the study led Halpern-Felsher and Cauffman to 
conclude that “overall, adults outperform adolescents on decision-making 
competence, as defined by their spontaneous consideration of options, risks, 
long-term consequences, and benefits associated with each decision.”176 
Adolescents are thus handicapped when they are interrogated; they will 
often make impulsive,177 short-sighted decisions to maximize what they 
perceive as the reward—being allowed to go home, avoid jail, or end the 
interrogation as quickly as possible.178 When adolescents are confronted with a 
stressful situation like an interrogation, they are less likely to adequately assess 
the risks associated with their decisions and understand all of their options 
when authority figures demand answers to questions.179 
Brain development studies demonstrate that adolescents make impulsive, 
short-sighted decisions not only because of their risk-weighing handicap,180 but 
also because their thinking is “present-oriented”181 and because of their weak 
 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Bonnie L. Halpern-Felsher & Elizabeth Cauffman, Costs and Benefits of a Decision: Decision-Making 
Competence in Adolescents and Adults, 22 J. APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 257, 265, 268 (2001) 
(comparing the responses of sixth-, eighth-, tenth-, and twelfth-grade students with adults’ responses to three 
open-ended hypothetical situations). 
 176 Id. at 268. 
 177 Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Sensation Seeking and Impulsivity as Indexed by 
Behavior and Self-Report: Evidence for a Dual Systems Model, 44 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1764, 1774 
(2008) (finding that adolescents are still developing impulse control well into young adulthood and that the 
data gathered “indicat[ed] a linear decline in impulsivity between ages 10 and 30”). 
 178 Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Explaining Juvenile False Confessions: Adolescent Development and 
Police Interrogation, 31 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 53, 55 (2007); see Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles’ 
Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents’ and Adults’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 357 (2003) (“[W]hen being interrogated by the police . . . younger adolescents are 
less likely, or perhaps less able, than others to recognize the risks inherent in the various choices they face or 
to consider the long-term, and not merely the immediate, consequences of their legal decisions.”). 
 179 See Grisso et al., supra note 178, at 357. 
 180 See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 181 Marty Beyer, Recognizing the Child in the Delinquent, 7 KY. CHILD. RTS. J. 16, 17 (1999). 
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“future orientation.”182 Jari-Erik Nurmi defined future orientation as a three-
stage process that includes setting goals for the future, making plans to achieve 
those goals, and evaluating those goals and plans to determine whether they are 
realizable.183 Nurmi concluded that adolescents’ thoughts about their futures 
only extend to the end of the second decade and the beginning of the third 
decade of their lives.184 Not only do adolescents focus on short-term 
consequences, but adolescents are also less likely than adults to even consider 
the long-term consequences of their decisions.185 Even when adolescents do 
consider long-term consequences, they place more weight on immediate risks 
and benefits.186 
Elizabeth Cauffman and Laurence Steinberg’s research supports the 
assertion that adolescents have weaker future orientation than adults.187 
Cauffman and Steinberg compared maturity of judgment in over one thousand 
adolescents and adults.188 Part of the study focused on the “perspective” of 
adolescents and adults, which was in part measured by the ability to recognize 
short- and long-term consequences.189 Cauffman and Steinberg found that 
adolescents have difficulty assessing long-term consequences.190 
Adolescents—even twelfth-grade students—scored lower than adults in the 
perspective category.191 
Adolescents’ weak future orientation increases their vulnerability in 
interrogation settings because they often look for the quickest and easiest way 
 
 182 Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and the Regulation of Youth Crime, 
FUTURE CHILD., Fall 2008, at 15, 20 [hereinafter Scott & Steinberg, Adolescent Development]; accord 
Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, 
Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1012 (2003) 
[hereinafter Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty]. 
 183 Jari-Erik Nurmi, How Do Adolescents See Their Future? A Review of the Development of Future 
Orientation and Planning, 11 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 1, 4 (1991). 
 184 Id. at 27. Nurmi also stated that “few 11- to 15-year-old adolescents expressed hopes which they 
expected to be realized after the age of 30.” Id. 
 185 Scott & Steinberg, Adolescent Development, supra note 182, at 20. 
 186 GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: A HANDBOOK 196 
(2003) (noting that although an adolescent may be aware of the negative consequences of confessing, “the 
perceived immediate gains outweigh the perceived and uncertain long-term consequences”); Scott & 
Steinberg, Adolescent Development, supra note 182, at 20. 
 187 Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Why 
Adolescents May Be Less Culpable than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 741, 759 (2000). 
 188 Id. at 745–46. Cauffman and Steinberg used psychosocial factors—responsibility, perspective, and 
temperance—to measure maturity of judgment in adolescents and adults. Id. at 745. 
 189 Id. at 748. 
 190 Id. at 759. 
 191 Id. at 754. 
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out of their predicament—confessing to the crime so that they can leave the 
interrogation room.192 Adolescents’ failure to consider the long-term 
consequences of their decisions in the interrogation room, combined with their 
risk-weighing handicap, causes them to make poor decisions that have serious 
long-term consequences. 
3. Adolescents’ Compliance with Demands from Authority Figures 
Research confirms that adolescents display a greater desire than adults to 
comply with authority figures.193 Adolescents perceive adult authority figures 
as cooperative and truthful.194 Because adolescents are eager to please,195 they 
try to satisfy their adult questioners by giving adults the type of information 
they want.196 In an interrogation setting, this has serious consequences for 
adolescents, who may fail to recount their actual knowledge of an event 
because they are tailoring their responses to satisfy their questioners.197 Even if 
adolescents give accurate answers to a question the first time, when the 
interrogator repeats the question it will cause many adolescents to “assume 
they gave the ‘wrong’ answer the first time, and feel pressure to provide the 
‘right’ answer when the question is repeated.”198 
Thomas Grisso has raised similar concerns about adolescents’ compliance 
with authority figures in interrogation settings, finding that “[a]dolescents are 
more likely than young adults to make choices that reflect a propensity to 
comply with authority figures, such as confessing to the police rather than 
remaining silent or accepting a prosecutor’s offer of a plea agreement.”199 
Adolescents’ propensity to comply with authority figures will be even more 
pronounced when police officers are present during the interrogation because 
 
 192 See Scott-Hayward, supra note 178, and accompanying text. 
 193 Stephen J. Ceci & Maggie Bruck, Suggestibility of the Child Witness: A Historical Review and 
Synthesis, in ANNUAL PROGRESS IN CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT 1994, at 195, 230 
(Margaret E. Hertzig & Ellen A. Farber eds., 1995); Grisso et al., supra note 178, at 357. 
 194 Ceci & Bruck, supra note 193, at 230. 
 195 Jessica R. Meyer & N. Dickon Reppucci, Police Practices and Perceptions Regarding Juvenile 
Interrogation and Interrogative Suggestibility, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 757, 764 (2007). 
 196 Ceci & Bruck, supra note 193, at 230. 
 197 See Meyer & Reppucci, supra note 195, at 763. 
 198 Steven A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, Tales from the Juvenile Confession Front: A Guide to How 
Standard Police Interrogation Tactics Can Produce Coerced and False Confessions from Juvenile Suspects, in 
INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT 127, 141 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004) (quoting John E.B. 
Myers, Karen J. Saywitz & Gail S. Goodman, Psychological Research on Children as Witnesses: Practical 
Implications for Forensic Interviews and Courtroom Testimony, 28 PAC. L.J. 3, 23 (1996)). 
 199 Grisso et al., supra note 178, at 357. 
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police officers are powerful authority figures and “often occupy an elevated 
position of power relative to children.”200 
Adolescents’ propensity to comply with authority figures is molded by the 
process of socialization, and socialization causes adolescents to feel significant 
pressure to acquiesce to adults’ wishes.201 Because of the process of 
socialization,202 many adolescents “literally regard their rights as those 
entitlements that adults permit them to exercise.”203 In the context of an 
interrogation, this means that when a police officer “requests” that an 
adolescent respond to his questions, the adolescent perceives that he has no 
option other than to answer the questions, and that if he refuses to answer 
questions he will face consequences for exercising his right.204 Even if a law 
enforcement officer is merely present during the interrogation, an adolescent 
may feel added pressure to comply because of the law enforcement officer’s 
authoritative presence.205 
When adolescents are interrogated, scientific research shows that they are 
more likely than adults to falsely confess; to make immature, impulsive 
decisions; and to provide information to satisfy their adult questioners.206 
These vulnerabilities demonstrate the coercive effect of law enforcement’s 
presence on adolescents in general interrogation settings and support this 
Comment’s proposal that the mere presence of law enforcement at a school 
interrogation triggers the Miranda rights that accompany custody. As 
discussed below, the public school setting further intensifies adolescents’ 
vulnerabilities during school interrogations. 
 
 200 Barbara Kaban & Ann E. Tobey, When Police Question Children: Are Protections Adequate?, 1 J. 
CENTER FOR CHILD. & CTS. 151, 155 (1999). 
 201 Gerald P. Koocher, Different Lenses: Psycho-Legal Perspectives on Children’s Rights, 16 NOVA L. 
REV. 711, 716 (1992). 
 202 Socialization refers to the process through which adolescents learn their roles in society. See id. at 715. 
Adolescents are “socialized” in large part by their families, social institutions, and schools. Id. 
 203 Id. Adolescents might also acquiesce to the authority figures’ requests because they feel 
powerlessness. See Lila Ghent Braine et al., Conflicts with Authority: Children’s Feelings, Actions, and 
Justifications, 27 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 829, 839 (1991). This feeling of powerlessness diminishes as 
adolescents get older. Id. 
 204 Koocher, supra note 201, at 716. 
 205 See id.; see also Holland, supra note 131, at 65. 
 206 See supra Part II.B. 
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III.  UNIQUE ASPECTS OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS EXACERBATE ADOLESCENTS’ 
VULNERABILITY DURING INTERROGATION 
In modern-day public schools, the increased presence of law enforcement 
has led to a greater level of cooperation between school officials and law 
enforcement.207 At the same time, students’ behaviors are being reported to the 
police more frequently than ever.208 The relationship between school officials 
and students has also undergone a transformation and can now be described as 
adversarial in many instances, thus causing many students to assume that 
school officials and law enforcement are working together on criminal 
investigations.209 These changes, together with how schools restrict students’ 
freedom of movement, combine to make interrogations conducted at school 
uniquely coercive. 
A. Greater Cooperation Between School Officials and Law Enforcement 
In response to growing safety concerns, schools have increased the 
presence of law enforcement in their buildings.210 As a result, the number of 
student interactions with law enforcement has dramatically increased.211 Law 
enforcement officers who work in schools—usually called school resource 
officers—perform both traditional law enforcement duties and school duties.212 
In some school districts, local police departments and schools have developed 
liaison programs through which police officers are stationed at schools.213 
Accordingly, Michael Pinard argued that the increased presence of law 
enforcement in schools has “fostered more cooperative, formalized and 
interdependent relationships between . . . schools and law enforcement 
 
 207 Pinard, supra note 110, at 1079; see infra Part III.A. 
 208 Pinard, supra note 110, at 1079–80; see infra Part III.B. 
 209 Holland, supra note 131, at 76–77 (stating that it is “understandable for students to view the [law 
enforcement] officers and the administrators as interchangeable”). 
 210 Besides the increased presence of law enforcement officers, many schools now subject students to 
metal detectors and drug tests. See generally Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); Eugene 
C. Bjorklun, Commentary, Using Metal Detectors in the Public Schools: Some Legal Issues, 111 EDUC. L. 
REP. 1 (1996). 
 211 Lisa H. Thurau & Johanna Wald, Controlling Partners: When Law Enforcement Meets Discipline in 
Public Schools, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 977, 978 (2009–2010) (attributing the increased presence of law 
enforcement to (1) increased federal funding to support police in schools; (2) high-profile school shootings; 
and (3) an increasingly strict approach to adolescent crime). 
 212 See id.; see also Pinard, supra note 110, at 1077–78. For a more detailed discussion of school resource 
officers, see Holland, supra note 131, at 74–76. 
 213 Pinard, supra note 110, at 1077. 
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agencies.”214 In other words, law enforcement and school officials are no 
longer working independently, but instead rely on each other to achieve their 
respective goals.215 
The cooperation between law enforcement and school officials creates 
confusion in the minds of students subjected to questioning.216 When school 
officials repeatedly and openly cooperate with law enforcement, interrogated 
students may no longer believe that the school officials are primarily 
concerned with the students’ welfare.217 Interrogated students may not believe 
the questioning is aimed at determining whether school rules were violated.218 
Instead, with law enforcement present, students may perceive questioning as 
more intense and likely to produce criminal charges, since law enforcement 
and school officials cooperate daily and transparently to achieve their 
respective goals.219 The presence of law enforcement officers increases the 
coercion that adolescent students feel during interrogation because law 
enforcement officers have “the power to arrest and [their] actions carry a threat 
of compulsion no [school official] acting alone can ever convey.”220 Because a 
law enforcement officer’s presence greatly intensifies the situation, his mere 
presence at a school interrogation transforms the encounter into custody. 
B. Dramatic Increase in the Amount of Student Behavior Reported to Police 
Students are increasingly vulnerable when questioned by school officials in 
the presence of law enforcement because statements obtained during 
questioning are often used against them in criminal proceedings.221 In today’s 
public schools, school officials are reporting more student activities to law 
enforcement, in part because modern laws require the reporting of certain types 
of criminal activity to law enforcement.222 For example, school officials must 
report certain criminal behavior to law enforcement, such as violations of “zero 
 
 214 Id. at 1079. 
 215 Id. 
 216 Holland, supra note 131, at 76–77 (noting that collaboration between school officials and law 
enforcement may blur the lines of authority and create confusion for students). 
 217 Id. at 89 (“It is unrealistic . . . to assume that a modern student, especially a student suspected of 
misconduct, would view a principal as someone looking out for her interests . . . .”). 
 218 See id. at 76–77. 
 219 Id. at 89 (noting that a school official who works closely with law enforcement “must appear [to 
students] to be as much a law enforcement figure as an educator”). 
 220 Id. at 60. 
 221 See Pinard, supra note 110, at 1099. 
 222 Id. at 1079–80. 
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tolerance” policies.223 In addition to reporting violations of zero tolerance 
policies, some states have laws that require school officials to contact law 
enforcement authorities whenever the school officials suspect criminal 
activity.224 As a result of these requirements, school officials now report to law 
enforcement student behavior that used to be handled solely through school 
internal disciplinary processes.225 
Because students who break school rules are likely to be subject to both 
school discipline and criminal charges, students who are interrogated by school 
officials in the presence of law enforcement may feel they cannot terminate the 
conversation and leave.226 Pinard found that “the increased placement of law 
enforcement officers . . . in public schools, along with the broader reporting 
requirements imposed upon school officials, has in many ways melded the 
criminal justice system with school disciplinary processes.”227 The presence of 
a law enforcement officer during questioning, combined with the possibility 
that the student will face criminal charges, creates a more coercive 
environment because the student may no longer think that the school official is 
conducting questioning for school disciplinary purposes.228 This environment 
is custodial because even if the school official asks all of the questions and the 
 
 223 Id. at 1109–12. The first zero tolerance policies stemmed from the Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994, Pub. 
L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3907 (repealed 2002). This Act required schools to expel a child for at least one year 
if the child brought or possessed a gun at school. Id. Since the statute was enacted, many states and schools 
have expanded their zero tolerance policies. The consequences of these policies have been discussed. See Am. 
Psychological Ass’n Zero Tolerance Task Force, Are Zero Tolerance Policies Effective in the Schools? An 
Evidentiary Review and Recommendations, 63 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 852, 856 (2008) (“Research indicates that 
many schools appear to be using the juvenile justice system to a greater extent and, in a relatively large 
percentage of cases, for infractions that would not previously have been considered dangerous or 
threatening.”). 
 224 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-24-60 (2004). 
 225 Pinard, supra note 110, at 1080; see also Michael Easterbrook, Taking Aim at Violence, PSYCHOL. 
TODAY, July/Aug. 1999, at 52, 56 (“As schools begin to resemble police precincts, school officials are 
abdicating their duty to counsel and discipline unruly students and letting the cops down the hall handle the 
classroom disruptions, bullying and schoolyard fights.”). 
 226 See Brief of Juvenile Law Ctr., et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 17, J.D.B. v. North 
Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (No. 09-11121), 2010 WL 5535752 (arguing that J.D.B. would not have felt 
free to leave). 
 227 Pinard, supra note 110, at 1096–97. 
 228 See Over-Policing in Schools on Students’ Education and Privacy Rights, N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, 
http://www.nyclu.org/ content/over-policing-schools-students-education-and-privacy-rights (last visited Nov. 
16, 2012) (noting that the over-policing of schools “foster[s] environments where children perceive that they 
are being treated as criminals . . . consequentially, [students] cultivate negative attitudes toward their 
schools”); see also Pinard, supra note 110, at 1107–08 (stating that law enforcement officers are “gatekeepers” 
who make the initial decisions regarding which students will be introduced into the criminal justice system). 
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officer is merely present during questioning, the officer’s presence will surely 
impact the student’s response.229 
C. The Adversarial Relationship Between Students and School Officials 
The adversarial relationship between students and school officials is a 
coercive factor that weighs in favor of finding that students are in custody 
when questioned by school officials in the presence of law enforcement. When 
both law enforcement and school officials are present during questioning, the 
student may perceive both of these adult authority figures as opponents.230 
The assertion that students and school officials have an adversarial 
relationship runs counter to the Supreme Court’s underlying rationale in New 
Jersey v. T.L.O.231 Accordingly, this section argues that the underlying 
rationale of T.L.O. no longer accurately depicts school officials’ relationships 
with students in modern public schools. 
In T.L.O., the Court held that, in the Fourth Amendment context, school 
officials have a “substantial interest . . . in maintaining discipline in the 
classroom and on school grounds”232 and that this need requires leniency when 
school officials conduct searches.233 Because school officials have “special 
needs,” the Court concluded that school officials do not need to obtain search 
warrants or have probable cause before searching their students.234 Instead, the 
Court held that school officials could conduct searches if the search was 
reasonable under all of the circumstances.235 The Court opined that this lesser 
standard was necessary to accommodate school officials’ “freedom to maintain 
order in the schools.”236 
Concurring in T.L.O., Justice Powell described the relationship between 
school officials and students as a “special relationship.”237 He stated that, while 
law enforcement’s relationship with criminal suspects was adversarial, the 
relationship between school officials and students was rarely adversarial 
because “there is a commonality of interests between teachers and their 
 
 229 Holland, supra note 131, at 65. 
 230 See supra note 219. 
 231 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
 232 Id. at 339. 
 233 Id. at 340. 
 234 Id. at 332 n.2, 340–41. 
 235 Id. at 341. 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. at 349 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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pupils.”238 According to Justice Powell, this commonality of interests arises 
because school officials are personally responsible for students’ welfare and 
education.239 Although the Court in T.L.O. applied the special needs doctrine to 
Fourth Amendment searches, “[m]any courts have simplistically combined 
T.L.O. and Miranda and assumed that Miranda does not apply to questioning 
by school officials unless those officials are acting as agents of law 
enforcement.”240 
T.L.O.’s rationale that school officials and students share a commonality of 
interests no longer realistically depicts modern public schools.241 Because 
school officials are often required to report students’ criminal activity and any 
suspicion of criminal activity to law enforcement, school officials and 
interrogated students now have a more adversarial relationship.242 
Furthermore, the increased presence of law enforcement in schools and the 
cooperation between school officials and law enforcement suggest that school 
officials do not always consider the best interests of interrogated students.243 
Instead, questioning that is purportedly undertaken for school disciplinary 
purposes “frequently become[s] subterfuge[], if not pretext, for the quick 
referral of minors to the local police department and criminal prosecution.”244 
A student subject to interrogation by a school official in the presence of law 
enforcement may assume that the two adult authorities are working together on 
the criminal investigation. The reasons for this are: the increased presence of 
law enforcement in schools, the greater cooperation between school officials 
and law enforcement, and the adversarial relationship between school officials 
 
 238 Id. at 349–50. 
 239 Id. at 350. 
 240 Holland, supra note 131, at 41. 
 241 Many scholars have argued that the assumptions underlying the Court’s holding in T.L.O. are no 
longer accurate. See, e.g., Josh Kagan, Reappraising T.L.O.’s “Special Needs” Doctrine in an Era of School-
Law Enforcement Entanglement, 33 J.L. & EDUC. 291, 294 (2004) (arguing that T.L.O.’s assumption that 
schools and law enforcement are “fundamentally separate institutions” has been undermined by recent 
developments); Pinard, supra note 110, at 1097–98 (arguing that T.L.O. must be revisited because of the 
interdependent relationships between law enforcement and school officials). See generally A. James Spung, 
Comment, From Backpacks to Blackberries: (Re)Examining New Jersey v. T.L.O. in the Age of the Cell 
Phone, 61 EMORY L.J. 111 (2011) (arguing that T.L.O.’s “heavily abridged safeguards” need to be reevaluated 
in the school search context). 
 242 Cf. Josh Kagan, supra note 241, at 291, 320 (arguing that T.L.O. is inapplicable in schools where 
excessive entanglement between school officials and law enforcement exists). 
 243 See supra notes 217–18 and accompanying text. 
 244 Meg Penrose, Miranda, Please Report to the Principal’s Office, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 775, 778 
(2006). 
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and students.245 Even if the law enforcement officer does not ask questions, his 
presence will likely cause the interrogated student to feel apprehensive and 
fearful, affecting the way the student responds to the school official’s 
questions.246 Thus, the law enforcement officer’s mere presence is authoritative 
and creates an overwhelming power imbalance in a student interrogation 
occurring at school. To combat this power imbalance, students need to be 
warned of their Miranda rights when a law enforcement officer is present at 
school interrogations. 
D. Students’ Restricted Freedom of Movement in Public Schools 
Students are subject to many restrictions that limit their movement while 
they are on school grounds. Mandatory attendance laws require students to 
attend school;247 they cannot leave when they want or roam the building at 
will, but must ask for permission to leave their classrooms or the building.248 
When students receive orders by school officials, they are expected to comply 
or face disciplinary action.249 These factors increase the coerciveness that 
students perceive in school interrogation settings. The Court in J.D.B. seemed 
to recognize that the school setting was unique, stating that “the effect of the 
schoolhouse setting cannot be disentangled from the identity of the person 
questioned. A student—whose presence at school is compulsory and whose 
disobedience at school is cause for disciplinary action—is in a far different 
position than, say, a parent volunteer.”250 
The restraint of movement that students experience during interrogation in 
school settings is analogous to the restraint of movement that military service 
members experience during interrogation in their own homes. Although 
interrogations in the home have not been traditionally protected,251 the First 
 
 245 See supra note 219. 
 246 Holland, supra note 131, at 65. 
 247 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 660 n.14 (1977) (documenting that compulsory school 
attendance laws existed in all states by 1918); Holland, supra note 131, at 85 n.175 (arguing that law 
enforcement officers can take advantage of adolescents’ compulsory presence at school by interviewing them 
at school); Lee Remington, Note, The Ghost of Columbine and the Miranda Doctrine: Student Interrogations 
in a School Setting, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 373, 390 (2002) (arguing that children have no choice but to obtain an 
education because of compulsory attendance laws and truancy laws). 
 248 See Remington, supra note 247, at 390 (comparing teachers and school officials to prison wardens 
because they decide when students may leave the classroom and where students are allowed to go). 
 249 See infra note 267 and accompanying text. 
 250 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2405 (2011). 
 251 Courts have been very reluctant to find custodial interrogation when individuals are interrogated in 
their homes. See, e.g., United States v. Craighead, 539 F.3d 1073, 1083 (9th Cir. 2008) (opining that “courts 
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Circuit recently demonstrated that it is willing to extend the custody analysis to 
this area under certain circumstances.252 In United States v. Rogers, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that a service member was in 
custody when questioned in his home.253 The court recognized that the 
interrogation was coercive because the service member had been ordered to 
report home by a commanding officer.254 In determining that the service 
member had been subjected to custodial interrogation, the court noted that the 
most significant factor was that “the military had made certain that [the service 
member] did not walk into [his home] voluntarily, or confront the police with 
free choice to be where he was.”255 The court inferred that the service 
member’s “situation at the house would have left any member of the armed 
services reasonably feeling that he lacked free choice to extricate himself, and 
sufficiently compelled to answer to authority.”256 
The First Circuit’s analysis of the coercive factors in Rogers has 
implications for courts’ custody analyses in school interrogation settings. A 
school official’s orders to students are analogous to a military officer’s orders 
to his subordinates because both are premised on a culture that demands 
submission to authority—resulting in little autonomy for the students and 
lower-ranked military personnel. 
In schools, as in the military, students must follow orders or face 
disciplinary action by those in authority.257 These orders were explicit at 
J.D.B.’s school, as his student handbook “instructs students to ‘[f]ollow 
directions of all teachers/adults the first time they are given,’ ‘[s]top moving 
 
have generally been much less likely to find that an interrogation in the suspect’s home was custodial in 
nature” because the Miranda concerns about coercion are less likely to be present when the suspect is in the 
comfort of his home). 
 252 United States v. Rogers, 659 F.3d 74, 79 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 253 Id. The Ninth Circuit also recently reexamined the custody analysis as it applies to the home. See 
Craighead, 539 F.3d at 1073. In Craighead, the court held that the defendant, a member of the Air Force, was 
in custody in his home when eight law enforcement officers from three different enforcement agencies were 
present during questioning. Id. at 1084–85, 1089. 
 254 Rogers, 659 F.3d at 76, 79. 
 255 Id. at 78. 
 256 Id. at 79. 
 257 See, e.g., J.D. v. Commonwealth, 591 S.E.2d 721, 723–24 (Va. Ct. App. 2004) (finding no custody 
existed despite testimony from the assistant principal that a student could be disciplined if he refused to obey 
school administrators and testimony from the student confirming that this threat of discipline made him feel 
like he had no choice but to go to the office and cooperate). 
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when an adult addresses’ them, and ‘[w]alk away only after the adult has 
dismissed’ them.”258 
Adolescents’ propensity to comply with authority figures may lead them to 
comply with the demands of school officials and law enforcement.259 Studies 
have shown that adolescents gauge the weight of an adult’s authority by 
examining the social context.260 Psychologists Marta Laupa and Elliot Turiel 
determined that “[c]hildren will accept as authorities those persons who hold 
social positions at school when they issue directives in the context of the 
school.”261 Therefore, the social context of the school setting may enhance 
adolescents’ perceptions of authority figures whom they encounter there.262 
Students’ perception of authority has important implications when 
analyzing the coerciveness of school interrogation settings.263 Because students 
generally consider principals to have the most authority in the school,264 the 
student will perceive both the school official and law enforcement officer as 
having great authority when both figures are present during questioning.265 
Just as a service member cannot protest his daily schedule, students cannot 
challenge the rules that restrict them in school because they must submit to 
authority.266 When a student is called to the principal’s office, that student has 
no choice but to go to the office.267 Like J.D.B., students may even be escorted 
 
 258 In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d 135, 143 (N.C. 2009) (Brady, J., dissenting) (alterations in original), rev’d and 
remanded sub nom. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011). 
 259 Braine et al., supra note 203, at 835. 
 260 See, e.g., Marta Laupa & Elliot Turiel, Children’s Concepts of Authority and Social Contexts, 85 J. 
EDUC. PSYCHOL. 191, 191 (1993) [hereinafter Laupa & Turiel, Children’s Concepts] (stating that “children 
judge that holding a social position . . . is one attribute that legitimizes a teacher’s directives within the social 
context of the school”); Marta Laupa, Children’s Reasoning About Three Authority Attributes: Adult Status, 
Knowledge, and Social Position, 27 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 321, 321 (1991) [hereinafter Laupa, 
Children’s Reasoning]. 
 261 Laupa & Turiel, Children’s Concepts, supra note 260, at 192. 
 262 See id. (stating that children perceive adults who hold social positions at school as authority figures 
who must be obeyed). 
 263 Id. 
 264 Id. at 196. 
 265 Laupa, Children’s Reasoning, supra note 260, at 328. 
 266 For example, if J.D.B. had refused to accompany the officer to the principal’s office, he could have 
been prosecuted for disturbing the peace. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.4(a)(6) (2011) (stating that a person 
engages in disorderly conduct when he intentionally “[d]isrupts, disturbs, or interferes with the teaching of 
students at any public . . . educational institution”). 
 267 In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d 135, 144 (N.C. 2009) (Brady, J., dissenting) (“J.D.B. had no choice but to 
comply with his removal from the classroom and [the officer’s] instructions to walk to the conference room. If 
J.D.B. had refused to accompany [the officer] he likely would have faced disciplinary action from the 
school.”), rev’d and remanded sub nom. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011); In re Killitz, 651 
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to the principal’s office by a police officer.268 As in Rogers,269 a student lacks 
the freedom to extricate himself from the principal’s office, and he is thus in 
custody because he is sufficiently compelled to answer to the school official 
and law enforcement officer. 
The unique aspects of modern public schools demonstrate the power 
imbalance that exists when school officials and law enforcement question 
students in tandem. When students are confronted by school and law 
enforcement officials, students may view them both as opponents.270 The mere 
presence of law enforcement transforms the encounter in the eyes of 
students—creating fear and apprehension.271 Because adolescents are already 
incredibly vulnerable in regular interrogation settings, the added coercive 
aspects of the school environment tip the scales heavily in the questioners’ 
favor. Therefore, students need to be given Miranda warnings to restore 
balance to these types of interrogations. 
IV.  COUNTERVAILING CONCERNS 
This Comment proposes that the mere presence of law enforcement while a 
student is being questioned by a school official—on school grounds and about 
potential criminal behavior—amounts to custody and triggers the 
administration of Miranda warnings. 
Accordingly, this Part addresses the anticipated counterarguments to this 
proposal, including: (1) giving Miranda warnings to students will result in 
fewer confessions; (2) requiring Miranda warnings whenever a law 
enforcement officer is present conflicts with the totality-of-the-circumstances 
test that currently determines custody; (3) administering Miranda warnings 
will create an even more adversarial relationship between school officials and 
students; and (4) changing the custody analysis is not enough to provide 
meaningful constitutional protections to adolescent students. 
 
P.2d 1382, 1384 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (“[D]efendant cannot be said to have come voluntarily to the place of 
questioning. He would likely have been subject to the usual school disciplinary procedures had he not 
complied with the principal’s request that he come to the office.”). 
 268 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2398–99 (2011). 
 269 United States v. Rogers, 659 F.3d 74, 79 (1st Cir. 2011) (asserting that “whenever a member of the 
services is questioned in circumstances mandated by a superior’s order, he is in the situation that Miranda was 
meant to address, where the line between voluntary and involuntary response is at least so blurred that the Fifth 
Amendment guarantee is in jeopardy”). 
 270 See supra note 219. 
 271 See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
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This Comment’s thesis may be resisted because of the possibility that 
administering Miranda warnings will result in fewer confessions. This 
argument has been used to attack the Miranda decision for years.272 However, 
many scholars argue that Miranda has had little impact on the number of 
confessions273 and less impact on the effectiveness of criminal investigations 
than originally feared.274 Indeed, many scholars believe that Miranda has 
increased police professionalism instead of decreasing the number of 
prosecutions.275 
To the extent that giving Miranda warnings does serve as an impediment to 
obtaining confessions, this is inherent in the Bill of Rights.276 When law 
enforcement is involved in school interrogations, inadequate protections exact 
a high price—adolescents’ entrance into the criminal justice system.277 
Requiring Miranda warnings when law enforcement is present encourages law 
enforcement to slow down and conduct interrogations using methods that 
protect adolescent students’ rights.278 
To minimize the loss of confessions, Professor Paul Holland proposed a 
preliminary custody analysis that would require little change to the current 
 
 272 See GARY L. STUART, MIRANDA: THE STORY OF AMERICA’S RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT 100 (2004) 
(stating that the most frequent criticism of Miranda has been that Miranda warnings hamper law 
enforcement’s ability to obtain confessions quickly before the subject of the interrogation has an opportunity to 
create an alibi). 
 273 See, e.g., id. at 101 (responding to critics’ assertions that Miranda would prevent the admissibility of 
freely given confessions before any police investigation and showing that “as of 1988, less than 1 percent of all 
American criminal cases had been dismissed because of ‘unwarned’ confessions. And only a fraction of that 1 
percent was dismissed for noncompliance with Miranda” (footnote omitted)); George C. Thomas III, Plain 
Talk About the Miranda Empirical Debate: A “Steady-State” Theory of Confessions, in THE MIRANDA DEBATE: 
LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING 236, 237–38 (Richard A. Leo & George C. Thomas III eds., 1998). 
 274 See, e.g., Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, in THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, 
AND POLICING, supra note 273, at 208, 208–09 (noting, however, that some inefficiencies may occur). 
 275 STUART, supra note 272, at 101. 
 276 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967) (“The privilege against self-incrimination is, of course, related 
to the question of the safeguards necessary to assure that admissions or confessions are reasonably trustworthy, 
that they are not the mere fruits of fear or coercion, but are reliable expressions of the truth. . . . [T]he privilege 
reflects the limits of the individual’s attornment to the state and—in a philosophical sense—insists upon the 
equality of the individual and the state.”). In Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000), the Court 
held that Miranda was a constitutionally based decision, although the warnings themselves are not 
constitutionally required. 
 277 See, e.g., Paul J. Hirschfield, Preparing for Prison? The Criminalization of School Discipline in the 
USA, 12 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 79, 82 (2008) (describing how the importation of the criminal justice 
system into schools has led to the increased criminalization of student behavior). 
 278 See generally Kassin et al., supra note 151, at 30 (arguing that law enforcement should receive special 
training so that they will appreciate how their interrogation techniques affect adolescents). 
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administration of Miranda warnings.279 In his article, Holland advocated for a 
custody analysis focused on the relationships of the parties involved in the 
questioning.280 He argued that courts should engage in a preliminary analysis 
to determine whether Miranda applies to a particular school interrogation.281 
This analysis involves asking whether, under the particular circumstances, a 
reasonable student would believe that he “was the subject of law enforcement 
activity.”282 To determine what a reasonable student would believe, Holland 
argued that the court should examine the relationships among all parties 
involved.283 This would include examining “the background norms within the 
school as to how authority is asserted in such situations.”284 
Although Holland’s proposal respects the purpose of the custody analysis 
by requiring an analysis of the coercive elements of the school interrogation 
environment,285 it fails to give school officials and law enforcement a way to 
predict which types of student interrogations will require Miranda warnings. 
Under his model, school officials and law enforcement have little direction as 
to what constitutes custody, which would likely cause them to inconsistently 
protect interrogated students. In contrast, this Comment proposes a clear rule 
that would provide direction to school officials and law enforcement. 
Second, because this Comment proposes a clear rule, requiring Miranda 
rights whenever law enforcement is present seems to conflict with custody’s 
totality-of-the-circumstances test. However, there is doctrinal precedent for 
identifying a highly coercive factor that drives the custody analysis.286 For 
example, courts have held that transporting a suspect in a police car287 or 
 
 279 Holland, supra note 131, at 43–44. Holland argued that consideration of the relationships among 
students, officers, and administrators “need not interfere greatly with the effective administration of school 
safety or discipline. A school administrator and even a school-based police officer could question a student in 
most school settings without the need to advise the student of his Miranda rights.” Id. 
 280 See id. at 72. 
 281 See id. 
 282 See id. (emphasis omitted). 
 283 See id. 
 284 See id. 
 285 Id. 
 286 See infra notes 287–88. 
 287 See, e.g., Weaver v. State, 806 S.W.2d 615, 620 (Ark. 1991) (noting that transportation in a police car 
is a significant factor in finding that a person was in custody); Mulligan v. State, 271 A.2d 385, 390 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1970) (“The taking of [the suspect] to the police station in the police car was, in the circumstances, 
depriving him of his freedom of action in a significant way; he was in custody within the contemplation of 
Miranda.”); People v. Butler, 436 N.Y.S.2d 76, 78 (App. Div. 1981) (stating that the defendant was in custody 
when he was placed inside the police car and transported to the police precinct). 
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threatening or using force transforms an encounter into custody.288 Conversely, 
courts treat certain other factors as determinative that an individual was not in 
custody, such as when an individual was interrogated in his own home.289 
Therefore, this Comment’s proposal is consistent with courts’ previously 
demonstrated willingness to identify certain factors that drive the custody 
analysis. 
Third, there may be concern that giving Miranda warnings to students will 
make the relationship between school officials and students more 
adversarial.290 This Comment argues that the relationship between school 
officials and students is already adversarial.291 Even if this relationship was 
made more adversarial by the administration of Miranda warnings, the 
positives of giving Miranda warnings to students outweigh the negatives. At 
the very least, warning students of their Miranda rights would allow students 
to understand their custodial situation more clearly and would give them the 
ability to better gauge the intentions of school and law enforcement officials 
participating in the interrogation.292 
A fourth concern focuses on the idea that requiring Miranda warnings 
when law enforcement is present does not do enough to protect interrogated 
students’ constitutional rights.293 For example, to truly combat the power 
imbalance between law enforcement officers and students in school 
interrogation settings, some scholars have argued that courts and legislatures 
should consider four additional protections: (1) requiring all school 
 
 288 Courts often find custody existed when a suspect was handcuffed. See, e.g., United States v. Newton, 
369 F.3d 659, 676 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that “[h]andcuffs are generally recognized as a hallmark of a formal 
arrest”); United States v. Peterson, 506 F. Supp. 2d 21, 23–24 (D.D.C. 2007) (stating that the use of handcuffs 
is a significant factor in the custody analysis and holding that the suspect was in custody when officers forcibly 
entered his home and handcuffed him during the execution of a search warrant). 
 289 See supra note 251 and accompanying text. 
 290 Cf. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 676–78 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(discussing whether a suspicion-based drug testing program would cause the school environment to become 
more adversarial and discussing schools’ adversarial disciplinary measures). 
 291 See supra Part III. 
 292 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In re Gault’s holding is premised on the Court’s recognition that in 
adversarial settings people need rights to protect themselves from government power. Indeed, the In re Gault 
Court opined that one of the purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination “is to prevent the state, 
whether by force or by psychological domination, from overcoming the mind and will of the person under 
investigation and depriving him of the freedom to decide whether to assist the state in securing his conviction.” 
Id. at 47. 
 293 See Overview of the Miranda Debate, in THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING, supra 
note 273, at 1, 3 (asking if Miranda warnings are helpful when police officers use deceptive interrogation 
techniques to easily obtain confessions). 
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interrogations to be video recorded;294 (2) requiring a parent or “interested 
adult” to be present during questioning;295 (3) requiring a lawyer to be present 
during questioning;296 and (4) changing Miranda warnings so that adolescents 
adequately understand their rights.297 Whether these protections would 
ultimately be beneficial is beyond the scope of this Comment. Suffice it to say, 
this is meant to be the first step toward achieving a more meaningful balance in 
school interrogation settings. 
CONCLUSION 
Much of the school interrogation jurisprudence originated when courts had 
a rosier image of the public school environment and knew less about brain 
development. The realities of modern-day public schools and the evidence 
from neuroscientists and developmental psychologists require the custody 
analysis to be altered to reflect modern understanding. This Comment’s 
proposal—that the mere presence of a law enforcement officer at a student 
interrogation transforms the encounter into custody—is sensitive to modern 
realities and accordingly grants additional constitutional protection to 
adolescents. 
The Supreme Court in J.D.B. opened the door for a reevaluation of the 
dynamics of school interrogations when it considered scientific studies that 
show adolescents are incredibly vulnerable in general interrogation settings. 
Courts must take the next logical step: applying these scientific findings to the 
school environment and taking a critical look at what the reasonable adolescent 
student feels when interrogated by a school official in the presence of law 
 
 294 See Kassin et al., supra note 151, at 25 (discussing electronic recording of interrogations). 
 295 See Hillary B. Farber, The Role of the Parent/Guardian in Juvenile Custodial Interrogations: Friend 
or Foe?, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1277, 1288–89 (2004) (discussing which states have adopted “interested adult” 
statutes and the possible negative consequences associated with adoption); Thomas Grisso & Melissa Ring, 
Parents’ Attitudes Toward Juveniles’ Rights in Interrogation, 6 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 211, 221–23 (1979) 
(arguing that parents are unhelpful and can sometimes even be harmful when adolescents are interrogated); 
Gerald D. Robin, Juvenile Interrogation and Confessions, 10 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 224, 226 (1982) (stating 
that “parental guidance . . . often is not an adequate substitute for the advice of trained legal counsel” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 296 See Scott-Hayward, supra note 178, at 70 (discussing policy recommendations to reduce the risk of 
interrogation-induced false confessions). 
 297 See A. Bruce Ferguson & Alan Charles Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 39, 
54 (1970) (concluding that only “a small percentage of juveniles [are] capable of knowingly and intelligently 
waiving Miranda rights”); Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical 
Analysis, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134, 1153 (1980) (finding that less than 21% of adolescents were able to 
adequately understand all aspects of Miranda warnings). 
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enforcement. Until this happens, courts will continue to perpetuate outdated 
assumptions instead of dealing with present-day challenges. 
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